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1Abstract.
Diﬀerent theories of expectation formation and learning usually yield diﬀerent outcomes
for realized market prices in dynamic models. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
expectation formation and learning in a controlled experimental environment. Subjects are
asked to predict next periods aggregate price in a dynamic commodity market model with
feedback from individual expectations. Subjects have no information about underlying
market equilibrium equations, but can learn by observing past price realizations and
predictions. We conduct both a stable, an unstable and a strongly unstable treatment.
In the stable treatment rational expectations (RE) yields a good description of observed
aggregate price ﬂuctuations: prices remain close to the RE steady state. In the unstable
treatments prices exhibit large ﬂuctuations around the RE steady state. Although the
sample mean of realized prices is close to the RE steady state, the amplitude of the
price ﬂuctuations as measured by the variance is signiﬁcantly larger than the amplitude
under RE, implying persistent excess volatility. However, agents’ forecasts are boundedly
rational in the sense that ﬂuctuations in aggregate prices are unpredictable and exhibit
no forecastable structure that could easily be exploited.
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21 Introduction
The question whether ‘expectations matter’ and may cause excess price volatility, above
and beyond volatility driven by news about underlying economic fundamentals, has been
a matter of heavy debate among economists for many decades already. In a pioneering
paper, Shiller (1981) for example argued that stock prices are excessively volatile. The
present paper may be viewed as an experimental testing of expectation formation and
learning in a dynamic market setting. We employ the simplest of all dynamic economic
market models, the classical cobweb or ‘hog cycle’ model, to investigate whether agents
learn the unique steady state rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or whether excess
price volatility is a persistent phenomenon.
In modeling price movements in real markets the expectations hypothesis is a key
assumption. Any dynamic economic model has a self-referential or expectations feedback
structure, where expectations about future variables aﬀect realizations of actual variables
and new realizations in turn lead to new expectations. In modeling dynamic markets this
interaction is repeated ad inﬁnitum and the underlying expectations hypothesis is thus
crucial in determining dynamic market equilibrium. Since the pioneering work of Muth
(1961) and Lucas (1971) the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) has become (and
currently still is) the dominating paradigm in expectation formation in economics and
ﬁnance. According to the REH agents use all available information and their subjective
expectation equals the mathematical expectation conditional upon this information. In
implementing the REH in economic modeling it is usually assumed that agents have per-
fect knowledge about market equilibrium equations. The agents in the model use these
equations to compute their optimal predictions for future variables. In a rational expec-
tations equilibrium forecasts coincide (on average) with realizations.
Until the sixties, before the rational expectations (RE) revolution, it was common
practice to use simple habitual rule of thumb predictors for agents’ expectations in dy-
namic market models. The best known textbook example is probably the cobweb market
equilibrium model or ‘hog cycle’ model with a one period production lag. Ezekiel (1938)
investigated the price dynamics in the cobweb model under naive expectations, where the
expected price for tomorrow equals today’s price. Nerlove (1958) studied price ﬂuctuations
under adaptive expectations, where the expected price is adapted by a constant factor in
the direction of the latest observed market price. Under naive or adaptive price expecta-
tions, price ﬂuctuations in the (linear) cobweb model are characterized by up and down
oscillations around the market equilibrium steady state, either converging or diverging
3from the steady state price. The rational expectations argument against these mechanical
forecasting rules is well known. Agents make systematic forecasting errors along the ‘hog
cycles’, and rational agents would learn from these forecasting errors and revise expec-
tations accordingly. In the cobweb model, the only forecast without systematic errors is
the prediction that the price will be at its steady state value where demand and supply
intersect. This rational expectations equilibrium is unique and can be derived easily, when
demand and supply curves are known to the agents.
There seems to be general agreement among economists that the REH assumes too
much knowledge of the agents. In particular, the assumption that agents have perfect
knowledge of underlying market equilibrium equations is at odds with practice in real
markets. In the last decade much theoretical work has been done on bounded rationality,
in an attempt to back oﬀ from rational expectations. Instead, in the bounded rationality
framework agents are assumed to form expectations based upon time series observations.
Recent surveys on bounded rationality in expectation formation include Sargent (1993,
1999), Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001) and Marimon (1997). Bounded rational agents
have some simple model of the world, the perceived law of motion, and try to learn or
optimize the parameters of their perceived law of motion, e.g. by an econometric tech-
nique such as ordinary least squares, as additional observations become available. An
important question in the bounded rationality work is whether or not adaptive learning
schemes converge to a RE steady state. If convergence occurs, REE would be an accurate
description of the realized market equilibrium outcome, at least in the long run, and this
REE outcome could be attained without any knowledge of market equilibrium equations.
For the cobweb model, indeed a number of papers have argued that simple learning
rules based upon time series observations enforce convergence to the unique RE steady
state. For example, Bray and Savin (1986) show that if agents employ ordinary least
squares learning prices converge to the REE steady state. Arifovic (1994) shows that con-
vergence to the RE equilibrium occurs when agents use genetic algorithm learning. Finally,
Hommes and Sorger (1998) have recently shown that, if agents learn the sample mean
and the ﬁrst order sample autocorrelation from observed past prices and use these in their
linear forecasting rule, convergence to the RE steady state occurs. These theoretical pa-
pers suggest that, in the cobweb model, learning of simple forecasting rules may stabilize
price ﬂuctuations and enforce convergence to the RE steady state, even when market equi-
librium equations are unknown. In contrast however, e.g. Chiarella (1988) and Hommes
(1994) show that the cobweb model with adaptive expectations need not converge to the
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state can arise. Brock and Hommes (1997) study the cobweb model with heterogeneous
expectations and show that under evolutionary learning prices need not converge to the
RE steady state. See also Grandmont (1998) and Grandmont and Laroque (1991) for a
general discussion how learning may lead to instability, and Guesnerie (1992, 2002) for a
discussion of eductive learning and coordination on rational expectations equilibria. The
main conclusion from this theoretical work is that diﬀerent theories of expectation forma-
tion and learning yield contradictory results concerning the stability or instability of the
(unique) RE steady state equilibrium in the cobweb framework.
Unfortunately, it is hard to test the expectations hypothesis empirically and to infer
the way people form expectations from economic or ﬁnancial data. Survey data research,
as for example in Frankel and Froot (1987) on inﬂation expectations and in Shiller (1989,
2000) on stock market expectations, yields useful insights on expectation formation but
also has its limitations, for example because of changing underlying economic funda-
mentals. Controlled laboratory experiments seem to be well suited to investigate which
expectation formation hypothesis is most accurate in describing human forecasting be-
haviour and observed aggregate market outcomes in particular situations. As noted e.g.
by Sunder (1995), it is remarkable that, despite an explosion of interest in experimental
economics, relatively few contributions have focused on expectation formation and learn-
ing in dynamic experimental markets with expectations feedback. Some exceptions are
the well known ‘bubble experiments’ by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) in an ex-
perimental asset market, the experimental work by Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) on
the role of price expectations in an inﬂationary overlapping generations economy and the
experiments by Marimon and Sunder (1993) on hyperinﬂations. These studies can not be
viewed however as pure experimental testing of the expectations hypothesis, everything
else being constant, because in all these cases dynamic market equilibrium is aﬀected
not only by expectations feedback but also by other types of human behaviour, such as
trading behaviour. Two other related papers, Hey (1994) and Kelley and Friedman (2002)
focus exclusively on expectation formation on time series generated by stationary stochas-
tic processes. Hey (1994) studies forecasting of a ﬁrst order autoregressive process, and
ﬁnds that “subjects are trying to behave rationally, but frequently in a way that appears
adaptively”. Kelley and Friedman (2002) consider learning in an Orange Juice Futures
price forecasting experiments, where prices are driven by a linear stochastic process with
two exogenous variables (weather and competing supply). They ﬁnd that learning is slow
5but quite consistent in the sense that estimated coeﬃcients slowly converge to the true
values. In these papers, the stochastic process is exogenous however, so that there is no
expectations feedback as in dynamic market equilibrium models. The key diﬀerence with
our experiments is the self-referential structure in our setting.
The present paper may be viewed as experimental testing of the expectations hypothe-
sis in what is perhaps the simplest of all dynamic models, the cobweb model. A convenient
feature of the cobweb model is that it has a unique REE. Market equilibrium equations
are controlled and ﬁxed during the experiment (although they are subject to small de-
mand shocks). Subjects are asked to predict prices and their earnings are inversely related
to their quadratic forecasting errors. Price realizations only depend upon subjects’ price
expectations. In all treatments the experimental environment is stationary and the RE
steady state is ﬁxed and constant over time. All experiments are conducted in the CREED
Experimental Laboratory of the University of Amsterdam.
There have been a number of earlier “cobweb experiments” related to our work. Holt
and Villamil (1986) and Hommes, Sonnemans and van Velden (2000) conducted individual
cobweb experiments, where price ﬂuctuations are induced by decisions of a single individ-
ual. Carlson (1967) conducted hand-run experiments with subjects as cobweb suppliers.
Wellford (1989) conducted several computerized cobweb experiments, where market prices
are determined by subjects’ quantity decisions. A distinguishing feature of our approach is
that market prices are completely determined by forecasts made by a group of individuals,
everyting else being constant (only subject to small noise).
Using aggregate realized market prices from our experimental cobweb economy, three
important questions can be addressed:
1. Are subjects in the experiments ‘on average’ able to learn the unique RE steady state
price, or can realized market prices be signiﬁcantly upward or downward biased?
2. Is there evidence of excess price volatility, that is, is the price volatility (as measured
by the variance) in the experiments signiﬁcantly higher than the price volatility
under RE?
3. If prices do not converge to RE, is there still forecastable structure in realized market
prices that could be exploited by ‘smart’ agents?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the design of the experiment.
Section 3 brieﬂy recalls some benchmark expectation and learning models in the cobweb
framework. Section 4 presents the main experimental results, including statistics such as
6sample mean, sample variance and sample autocorrelations. Concluding remarks are given
in Section 5.
2 Experimental design
The well known cobweb or ‘hog cycle’ model describes price ﬂuctuations in an independent
market for a perishable consumption good, such as corn or hogs, that takes one unit of
time to produce. Producers thus have to forecast the market price one period ahead. In our
cobweb experiments, subjects have to predict next periods price of a certain, unspeciﬁed,
good. The subjects have limited information about this market. Subjects are told that
they are advisors to producers of an unspeciﬁed good and that the price is determined by
market clearing, i.e. equality of demand and supply. Subjects are also informed that there
is some uncertainty with respect to the demand and/or supply of the good due to market
uncertainties, e.g. a possibly bad harvest because of extreme weather conditions. Subjects
do not know market equilibrium equations, nor are they informed about the distributions
of any exogenous shocks to demand and/or supply. Based upon this limited information
we ask the subjects to predict next periods market price for 50 consecutive periods. The
predicted price always has to be between 0 and 10 and the realized price is also always
between 0 and 10.
The subjects are also informed that their earnings are inversely related to their predic-
tion error: the better their forecast, the higher their earnings. They can earn a maximum
of 1300 points per period. The payment in each period is based upon the quadratic payoﬀ
function





i,t is subject i’s prediction of the market price in period t,1≤ t ≤ 50, and pt is
the realized market price in that period. The expected value of this function is maximized
by pe
i,t = Ept. Negative payoﬀs are not possible; earnings are 0 if (pt − pe
i,t)2 > 5. At the
end of the experiment the points are exchanged to Dutch guilders at a rate 1300 points
= 1 guilder (≈ 0.45 Euro).
After every period the subjects are informed about the realized price in the experiment.
Also time series of the subjects own past predictions and a time series of the past realized
prices are shown on the screen, as illustrated in Figure 1.
7FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
At the beginning of each session the subjects are asked to read the instructions care-
fully. Two control questions are put into the instructions to make sure the subjects un-
derstand the experiment and the calculation of their earnings. Each session lasts for 50
periods. In each period, the aggregate realized market price depends upon the individual
expectations of 6 participants. A small random shock is added to the market equilibrium
equation in each period. The composition of the groups remains the same during the entire
experiment. Subjects are not informed about the identity of other group members, the
size of the group or the market equilibrium equation. Participants are not informed that
the realized price depends upon their forecast of the price and/or upon other forecasts
and they are not allowed to communicate. In total there were 108 subjects participating,
divided over three diﬀerent treatments, a stable, an unstable and a strongly unstable
treatment as discussed below. Each of the three treatments had 36 participants. Each
market of 50 periods consists of a ﬁxed group of 6 subjects; for each treatment six mar-
kets were run. Subjects (mostly undergraduates in economics, chemistry and psychology)
were recruited by means of announcements on information boards in university buildings.
Subjects earned on average FL.26,- (≈ 12 Euro) in approximately 75 minutes.
Subjects in the experiments thus have very little information about the price generat-
ing process. The information in the experiment is similar to the information assumption
underlying much of the theoretical bounded rationality literature, namely that individuals
form expectations based upon time series observations.
The realized market price pt in the experiment is determined by the cobweb market







where D(pt) is the demand for the good at price pt, K is the size of the group, S(·) denotes
the supply curve and pe
i,t is the prediction of the price in period t, made at date t − 1
by subject i. In our experiment the number of subjects in one market is ﬁxed at K =6 .








8In the experiment the demand curve is ﬁxed and simply linear:
D(pt)=a − bpt + ηt,a , b > 0, (4)
where ηt is a normally distributed random series representing a small demand shock in
period t. In all treatments, the parameters have been ﬁxed to a =1 3 .8 and b =1 .5. For





i,t − 6)) + 1,λ > 0. (5)
Supply is nonlinear, but increasing in producers’ expected price. It should be stressed
that since supply is increasing it is consistent with producers’ proﬁt maximization with a
convex cost function. The parameter λ tunes the nonlinearity of the supply curve and the
stability of the underlying cobweb model. Each of the three treatments corresponds to a
diﬀerent value of the parameter λ. A convenient feature of a nonlinear supply curve is
that, under naive or adaptive expectations, prices may diverge from the unstable steady
state, but remain bounded and converge to a (unique) stable 2-cycle, as will be discussed
below.
Given the (unknown) demand curve (4), the (unknown) supply curve (5) and the
individual forecasts of the market price by all participants, the realized market equilibrium








where ￿t = ηt/b is a (small) noise term proportional to the demand shock ηt. The shocks
￿t may thus be interpreted as intrinsic uncertainty about economic fundamentals. The
shocks ￿t are normally distributed with variance σ2
￿ =0 .25; the 50 realizations ￿t of the
random series were the same for each market.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
We conducted three diﬀerent treatments, a stable,a nunstable and a strongly unstable
treatment, depending upon the value of the parameter λ tuning the nonlinearity of the
supply curve, as summarized in Table 1. Each of the three treatments represents a sta-
tionary experimental environment with a ﬁxed and constant RE steady state p∗. Learning
this constant RE steady state over 50 time periods is made more diﬃcult by the (small)
9noise terms. Notice also that due to the diﬀerent values of λ each treatment has a diﬀerent
RE steady state price p∗.
The parameter λ aﬀects the stability of the cobweb model. According to the classical
cobweb theorem (e.g. Ezekiel (1938)), under naive expectations the steady state p∗ is
(locally) stable if the ratio σ = S0(p∗)/D0(p∗) of marginal supply over marginal demand
at the steady state is between −1 and 1. For our choice of the demand and supply curves
the stability condition becomes
−1 <
−16λe2λ(p∗−6)
(1 + e2λ(p∗−6))2 < 1.
The experimental designs for the three diﬀerent treatments are summarized in Table 1.
3 Benchmark models of expectations and learning
This section brieﬂy summarizes aggregate price ﬂuctuations in the cobweb model under
some benchmark models of expectations and learning, including rational expectations,
naive expectations, adaptive expectations and various adaptive learning schemes. In the
simulations, demand and supply curves are the same as in the strongly unstable treatment
of our cobweb experiments. In Section 4 we will compare our experimental results with
the benchmark cases to test which expectations hypothesis ﬁts our experiments best.
Figure 2 shows realized market prices for the benchmarks of rational expectations
(RE), naive expectations (Naive), adaptive expectations (w =0 .2), ‘learning by aver-
age’ and sample autocorrelation (SAC) learning, as discussed below. Figure 3 shows the
autocorrelations of realized market prices for each of these benchmark cases.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
Recall that under RE, producers forecast the price to be equal to the steady state at
which demand and supply curves intersect, i.e. pe
t = p∗. Given that all producers use the
10RE forecast, realized market prices in (6) are given by
pt = p
∗ + ￿t. (7)
Hence, under RE realized market prices ﬂuctuate randomly around the RE price p∗, with
small amplitude determined by the variance of the noise term (σ2
￿ =0 .25), as illustrated in
Figure 2a. The autocorrelation plot under RE in Figure 3a shows that price ﬂuctuations
are indeed uncorrelated and do not exhibit unexploited (linear) predictable structure.
Naive expectations means that all producers use the latest observed price as their
forecast, i.e. pe
t = pt−1. Figure 2b shows realized market prices under naive expectations.
This is the familiar ‘hog cycle’, with prices ﬂuctuating up and down with large amplitude
over the entire admissable interval [0,10]. Figure 3b shows the corresponding autocorre-
lation plot, exhibiting the regular (−,+,−,+,...) autocorrelation pattern which is typical
for the regular up and down cobweb ‘hog-cycles’, with the ﬁrst 13 lags being strongly
signiﬁcant. Naive producers not only make large forecasting errors, but these errors are
also systematic, since when their forecast pe
t = pt−1 is low (high) the realized market price
pt is high (low).





t−1 + w(pt−1 − p
e
t−1),
that is, producers adapt their forecast in the direction of the latest observed market price
with a constant fraction w. Adaptive expectations is therefore sometimes also called con-
stant gain error learning. Notice that w = 1 corresponds to naive expectations. Figure 2c
shows realized market prices under adaptive expectations for a small adaptive coeﬃcient
w =0 .2. The amplitude of the price ﬂuctuations is much smaller than under naive ex-
pectations but clearly larger than under RE. Due to the noise term ￿t the price pattern is
somewhat irregular, but on the other hand, e.g. between periods 25-40, prices still exhibit
fairly regular up and down oscillations. Figure 3c shows the corresponding autocorrela-
tion plot of realized market prices under AE. The autocorrelations are not as strong as
under naive expectations, but still exhibit the regular (−,+,−,+,...) pattern with the
ﬁrst 7 lags being signiﬁcant. As for naive producres, adaptive expectations producers are
thus irrational in the sense that observable forecastable structure in market prices is left
unexploited.
Another simple forecasting strategy is by the sample mean, i.e. pe







11is the sample mean of all previously observed prices. We will refer to this simple rule
as learning by average. This forecasting rule is equivalent to running an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression of prices on a constant, as studied in the cobweb context by
Bray and Savin (1986). Figure 2d shows realized market prices under learning by average.
The amplitude of the price oscillations quickly decreases, and prices seem to converge to
RE, with random ﬂuctuations around the constant RE steady state price after 10 time
periods. The corresponding autocorrelation plot is shown in Figure 3d with hardly any
signiﬁcant autocorrelations.
A ﬁnal learning rule, introduced recently by Hommes and Sorger (1998), is sample
autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning), where producers use a linear forecasting rule
p
e
t = αt + βt(pt−1 − αt)
and update the parameters αt by the sample average and βt by the ﬁrst order auto-
correlation coeﬃcient. Figure 2e shows realized market prices under SAC-learning. The
amplitude of the price oscillations quickly decreases, and prices seem to converge to RE,
with random ﬂuctuations around the constant RE steady state price after 10 time periods.
SAC-learning has signiﬁcant negative autocorrelations at lags 2 and 3, but this is mainly
caused by the initial large amplitude price ﬂuctuations; when restricted to the last 40
observations, i.e. after SAC-learning converges to the RE steady state, these signiﬁcant
autocorrelations disappear.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that for our strongly unstable treatment of the cobweb
experiments, diﬀerent expectations schemes and learning models lead to diﬀerent types
of price ﬂuctuations. Mechanical forecasting rules such as naive or adaptive expectations
lead to large amplitude price ﬂuctuations with linear forecastable structure in market
prices. It is important to note that, even in the strongly unstable case, simple learning
schemes, such as learning by average, OLS-learning and SAC-learning, enforce conver-
gence to RE. Hence, even for a strongly unstable cobweb market producers may learn
the RE price from time series observations, without any information about underlying
market equilibrium equations. The goal of our experiments is to investigate whether this
theoretical observation is valid in our cobweb laboratory experiments.
4 Experimental results
This section reports the results of the experiment. In Subsection 4.1 the earnings of the
participants are discussed, whereas Subsection 4.2 focusses on the ﬁrst two moments of
12realized market prices namely the sample mean and the sample variance. We compare
these sample means and sample variances to the theoretical benchmark cases of Section 3
and in particular we investigate whether market prices are biased (i.e. whether the sample
mean deviates from the RE steady state) and excessively volatile (i.e. whether the sample
variance of realized market prices is signiﬁcantly larger than the RE variance). Finally, the
predictability of realized market prices, as measured by sample autocorrelation patterns,
is investigated.
4.1 Earnings
Table 2 summarizes the average earnings over the subjects and its standard deviation
for the stable, unstable and strongly unstable treatments as well as for the RE and AE
benchmarks. The AE earnings reported in the table were computed with the supply
curve as in the strongly unstable treatment and with adaptive coeﬃcient w =0 .2. Notice
that the RE earnings reported in the table are equal for all treatments, since under RE
the forecasting errors are equal to the realizations of the shocks ￿t in (7), which were
identical for all treatments. An immediate observation from the table is that the average
earnings in the stable treatment are higher than the average earnings in the unstable and
the strongly unstable treatment. For all treatments the average earnings in the last 25
periods are higher than in the ﬁrst 25 periods. While the total average earnings of the
stable and the unstable treatments do not diﬀer a lot (only 6000 points) the diﬀerence
between the unstable and the strongly unstable is much bigger (almost 20000 points). More
importantly, the average earnings in the stable treatment are close to the average earnings
in the RE benchmark, especially in the subsample of the last 25 periods. Furthermore,
the total average standard deviation in the stable treatment is smallest. In the last 25
periods of the stable treatment the standard deviation is almost three times smaller than
in the ﬁrst 25 periods. For both the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments this is
not the case. To summarize, when the model becomes more stable the average earnings
of the subjects increase while the diﬀerence in earnings decreases.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
134.2 Testing the rational expectations hypothesis
In this section we investigate whether the RE hypothesis is an accurate description of
realized aggregate market prices, with or without a learning phase. Stated diﬀerently, we
investigate whether realized market prices in the experiments converge to the RE steady
state. We investigate the validity of RE as a description of aggregate price ﬂuctuations
by focusing on three important characteristics, namely whether realized market prices are
biased, whether price ﬂuctuations exhibit excess volatility and whether realized prices are
predictable. It seems natural to measure these characteristics by the mean, the variance
and the autocorrelation patterns of realized market prices, and compare these to the
corresponding RE characteristics. We investigate and compare these characteristics for
all treatments.
4.2.1 Price dynamics
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
Figure 4 shows the realized prices for all treatments, with the strongly unstable treat-
ment in the left panel, the unstable treatment in the middle panel and the stable treatment
in the right panel. In all markets, prices seem to ﬂuctuate irregularly without any clear
pattern. By eye inspection, it is immediately clear that in the strongly unstable treatment
the amplitude of the price ﬂuctuations is much larger than in the unstable and the stable
treatments. In the stable treatment (right panel) the amplitude of the price ﬂuctuations
is small and seems surprisingly close to the RE benchmark (cf. Figure 2a). In the unstable
treatment (middle panel) the amplitude of the price ﬂuctuations is larger and decreases
somewhat over time. In the strongly unstable treatment (left panel) the amplitude seems
to be much larger than in the RE benchmark, suggesting excess price volatility. Only for
group 1 (top left) of the strongly unstable treatment the amplitude of the price oscillation
decreases over 50 time periods. This group thus shows some form of learning and at least
a tendency to converge to RE, although the convergence seems to be much slower than
e.g. in the SAC benchmark (cf. Figure 2d).
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
14In order to investigate the validity of the RE hypothesis in our experiment, Table 3
shows the sample mean and sample variance of the realized prices for the stable, the
unstable and the strongly unstable treatment for the full sample of 50 periods as well
as for subsamples of the ﬁrst 25 and the last 25 periods. For all treatments, the sample
average of realized market prices is surprisingly close to the RE benchmarks of 5.91,
5.73 and 5.57, respectively. Over the full sample of 50 periods, in the strongly unstable
treatment the sample variance ranges from 1.56 to 4.23, which is much higher than the
variance 0.25 of the RE benchmark. In the unstable treatment the sample variance of
realized prices ranges from 0.46 to 0.80, which is also larger than the RE benchmark.
In the stable treatment, the sample variance of realized prices over the full sample of 50
periods ranges from 0.31 to 0.41, which is only slightly higher than the RE benchmark of
0.25. In the subsample of the last 25 periods, the sample variance in the stable treatment
ranges from 0.29 to 0.32, which is close to the variance under RE. In contrast, for the
unstable treatment and for the strongly unstable treatment in the subsample of the last
25 periods the sample variance ranges from 0.26 to 0.60 and from 0.66 to 3.32 respectively,
which is much higher than the variance under RE.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 shows the results for statistical tests comparing both the sample mean and
the sample variance of realized market prices to the theoretical RE-benchmarks. Using
the t-statistic, the null hypothesis that the sample mean of realized market prices is equal
to the RE steady state price can not be rejected for 17 out of 18 groups in the stable,
the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments. The only exception is group 2 of the
unstable treatment, for which the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level. Table 4
also shows the results for testing the null hypothesis that the sample variance of realized
market prices is equal to the variance under RE over the full sample of 50 periods. For
all groups in the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments the null hypothesis is
rejected at the 1% level. For two groups in the stable treatment (groups 2 and 6) we can
not reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. The earlier observation that, over the full
sample, the amplitude of price ﬂuctuations is larger than under the RE benchmark is thus
statistically signiﬁcant in all unstable cases and even in 4 stable cases.
15TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
It seems reasonable however to allow for some learning phase in the unknown, station-
ary cobweb environment. Table 5 shows the results for the statistical tests comparing both
the sample mean and the sample variance of realized market prices over the subsample
of the last 25 periods to the theoretical RE-benchmarks. In all cases, the null hypothesis
that the sample mean of realized market prices equals the RE steady state price can not
be rejected. In this sense, subjects are thus able to learn the correct price level. For the
stable treatment also the null hypothesis that the sample variance of realized prices is
equal to the variance under RE can not be rejected. For the unstable treatment this null
is rejected at the 5% level in 5 out of six cases, and for the strongly unstable treatment
in all cases. This suggests that in the stable treatment participants are on average able
to learn the RE steady state price. In the stable treatment, the ﬁrst two moments of the
long run empirical distribution of realized market prices correspond to the ﬁrst and second
moment of the RE benchmark. In the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments, only
the ﬁrst moment, i.e. the mean, corresponds to the RE benchmark, whereas the second
moment, i.e. the sample variance, is signiﬁcantly larger than for the RE benchmark. In
the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments, although subjects are able to learn the
correct price level, even after a learning phase of 25 periods, our cobweb experiments still
exhibit statistically signiﬁcant excess volatility in prices.
4.2.2 Predictability of prices
Finally, we investigate whether there is still forecastable structure in realized market prices
that could have been exploited by smart subjects to improve their forecasts. The simplest
and perhaps most important form of predictability is linear predictability, as measured
by sample autocorrelations.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Figure 5 shows the sample autocorrelation plots for the strongly unstable treatment
(left panel) as well as for the stable treatment (right panel). An immediate and important
16observation from Figure 5 is that realized market prices show no clear autocorrelation
pattern, with hardly any signiﬁcant lags. The only group exhibiting a clear and regular
autocorrelation pattern is group 5 of the strongly unstable treatment, which is charac-
terized by the regular (−,+,−,+,...) autocorrelation pattern that was also observed for
the AE benchmark. However, in contrast to AE, for group 5 only lags 1, 5, 7, 11, 15 and
16 are signiﬁcant. In general, signiﬁcant autocorrelations are rare, and in our cobweb ex-
periments realized market prices exhibit (almost) no linear predictable structure. In terms
of (linear) predictability the RE benchmark is thus a good description of our cobweb
experiments. Even in the unstable and the strongly unstable case where we have found
signiﬁcant excess price volatility in subsection 4.2.1 and market prices keep ﬂuctuating
with relatively large amplitude, participants in the experiment are not irrational in the
sense that there is no easily exploitable predictable structure in realized market prices.
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated expectation formation and learning in cobweb experiments. The
realized market price is determined by aggregation over six individual price forecasts.
Market equilibrium equations as well as distributions of exogenous shocks are unknown
to subjects. Subjects can only rely upon past observations of realized prices in forming
expectations. Market equilibrium equations are ﬁxed and thus stationary for 50 time pe-
riods, so that each market has a unique and constant RE price. A distinction is made
between a stable, an unstable and a strongly unstable treatment. In the stable treatment
under naive expectations prices will converge to the RE steady state price, whereas in
the unstable and the strongly unstable treatments under naive expectations prices diverge
from the RE steady state and converge to a 2-cycle. Simple benchmark models of learning,
such as learning by sample average, enforce convergence to the RE steady state price for
all three diﬀerent treatments. An important motivation for our paper is to investigate in
a controlled stationary laboratory environment, which expectations hypothesis yields an
accurate description of aggregate realized market prices in a cobweb type commodity mar-
ket. In particular, we investigate whether the RE benchmark provides a good description
of long run market price ﬂuctuations.
For all treatments the null hypothesis that the sample mean of realized market prices
is diﬀerent from the RE steady state price can not be rejected. One thus can say that in a
stationary experimental cobweb economy the ﬁrst moment, i.e. the mean, of the empirical
17distribution of realized market prices corresponds to the RE steady state price. Without
any knowledge about market fundamentals, subjects are thus on average able to learn the
correct price level.
In the stable treatment the second moment, i.e. the sample variance, of realized mar-
ket prices also is very close to the variance under RE. In the stable treatment, the null
hypothesis that the sample variance in the last 25 periods is equal to the sample variance
under RE can not be rejected. In contrast, in the unstable and the strongly unstable treat-
ments the null hypothesis that the sample variance of realized market prices is (smaller
than or) equal to the sample variance under RE is strongly rejected. For all groups in
the strongly unstable treatment and ﬁve out of six groups in the unstable treatment real-
ized market prices exhibit statistically signiﬁcant excess volatility, that is, a higher price
volatility than under RE.
For all treatments predictability of realized market prices was investigated by sample
autocorrelations. Typically, (almost) no signiﬁcant sample autocorrelations are found,
implying that there is little predictable structure left in realized market prices that could
have been easily exploited by ‘smart’ participants. Although in the unstable treatments
prices keep ﬂuctuating with large amplitude, these ﬂuctuations are irregular and fairly
unpredictable.
Which expectations hypothesis is a good description of aggregate realized market price
ﬂuctuations in a cobweb economy? The answer to this question depends on the stabil-
ity of the model. If the market is stable (under naive expectations), RE is a fairly good
description, at least after a short learning phase. Hence, even when agents do not know
market equilibrium equations the RE equilibrium concept may be a useful description of
aggregate market outcome. If the market is unstable however, RE is not a good description
since we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and persistent excess price volatility. It is remarkable that the
validity of RE exactly coincides with the stability of the simple naive expectations rule.
Adaptive expectations is not a good description of the experiments, since this typically
leads to fairly regular up and down price oscillations with regular autocorrelation patterns
in realized market prices. Adaptive learning schemes such as learning by sample average
or ordinary least squares learning (OLS)-learning are neither good descriptions of our
experimental outcomes since these schemes always converge quickly to RE. The experi-
mental outcome for an unstable cobweb economy may be described as a boundedly rational
heterogeneous expectations equilibrium where subjects are on average able to learn the
correct price level but diversity of beliefs leads to excess price volatility. More work on
18individual prediction strategies is needed to classify individual forecasting strategies.
Finally, we would like to discuss to which market institutions our results may apply. In
a cobweb type commodity market aggregate equilibrium prices are driven by producers’
individual price expectations. A key feature of the cobweb expectations feedback structure
is that it is self-reversing in the following sense. A high (low) price expectation of the
producers leads to high (low) production which, by market equilibrium of demand and
supply, leads to a low (high) realized market price. The cobweb commodity market is
thus a producers’ driven negative expectations feedback system. Our experiments show
that in a stationary environment with a negative expectations feedback structure, without
any knowledge about market equilibrium equations, subjects are able to learn the correct
price level. Apparantly, persistent under- or overvaluation does not arise in a commodity
market with a negative expectations feedback structure. This does not imply that prices
will converge to a steady state equilibrium price in such a market. The amplitude of
realized market price ﬂuctuations depends heavily on the sensitivity of the realized market
equilibrium price to individual expectations. Our cobweb experiments provide an example
that in a market where the realized market price is very sensitive to expectations excess
volatility, with large amplitude ﬂuctuations around the correct price level, may arise.
There is another, diﬀerent expectations feedback structure that seems important and
particularly relevant in speculative asset markets. In a speculative asset market, expecta-
tions are typically demand driven and are often self-fulﬁlling in the following sense. The
aggregate demand of a risky asset depends upon traders’ individual expectations of future
prices of the asset. High (low) price expectations of individual agents lead to a high (low)
aggregate demand of the asset which, by market equilibrium of demand and supply, leads
to a high (low) realized market price. A speculative asset market is thus a demand driven
positive expectations feedback system. In a recent Ph-D thesis van de Velden (2001) shows
that in an experimental speculative asset market it is indeed much harder for subjects to
learn the correct price level and persistent over- or undervaluation and price bubbles seem
more likely than in the producers’ driven commodity market considered in this paper. In
another recent paper, Hommes et al. (2005) present asset pricing laboratory experiments
where individuals coordinate their expectations on simple trend following rules leading
to (temporary) bubbles and asset price ﬂuctuations around a constant bechhmark funda-
mental price. We conclude that the market institution and in particular the nature of the
expectations feedback structure, whether it is producer or demand driven and whether the
feedback is positive or negative, seems to be a key element for the outcome of a learning
19process of market equilbrium prices. More experimental work is needed to investigate this
key problem in dynamic market phenomena in more detail.
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22Figure 1: Typical computer screen of a subject during the experiment. Time series of predictions
and realized values were plotted in diﬀerent colors on the computer screen.
23(a) RE (b) Naive
(c) AE (d) average
(e) SAC
Figure 2: Time series of realized prices for some benchmark cases in the strongly unstable
treatment: (a) rational expectations, (b) naive expectations, (c) adaptive expectations (w =0 .2),
(d) learning by sample average, and (e) SAC-learning.
24(a) RE (b) Naive
(c) AE (d) average
(e) SAC
Figure 3: Autocorrelation plots (with Bartlett 5% signiﬁcance bands) for the benchmark cases
of RE, Naive, AE, learning by average and SAC-learning in the strongly unstable treatment,
over the full sample of 50 periods.
25strongly unstable unstable stable
Figure 4: Time series of realized prices of the six groups in the strongly unstable treatment (left
panel), the unstable treatment (middle panel) and the stable treatment (right panel).
26strongly unstable unstable stable
Figure 5: Autocorrelation plots over the full subsample of 50 periods (with Bartlett 5% sig-
niﬁcance bands) for the six groups in the strongly unstable treatment (left panel) and the six
groups in the stable treatment (right panel)
27treatment stable unstable strongly unstable
parameter λ λ =0 .22 λ =0 .5 λ =2
RE-price p∗ 5.57 5.73 5.91
σ = S0(p∗)/D0(p∗) -0.87 -1.96 -7.75
# participants 36 36 36
Table 1: Design of the experiments for the three diﬀerent treatments. The parameter λ tunes
the nonlinearity of the supply curve. The RE steady state price p∗ changes slightly with λ.
The coeﬃcient σ = S0(p∗)/D0(p∗) determines the (local) stability of the cobweb model. As λ
increases, the cobweb model becomes more unstable. The number of subjects participating in
each treatment was 36.
Earnings
periods 1-25 periods 26-50 periods 1-50
Treatment mean SD mean SD mean SD
strongly unstable (λ =2 ) 12224 5388 17616 5234 29840 8884
unstable (λ =0 .5) 22246 2572 27329 2822 49575 4940
stable (λ =0 .22) 25649 2756 29545 948 55193 3430
RE 30653 - 30589 - 61242 -
AE (w =0 .2) 18694 - 19256 - 37950 -
Table 2: Average earnings of the subjects and its standard deviation in points for the three
treatments, over the full sample of 50 periods as well as over the subsamples of the ﬁrst 25 and
the last 25 periods. Note that 1300 points is equal to 1 guilder ≈ 0.45 Euro.
281-25 26-50 1-50
sample sample sample sample sample sample
average variance average variance average variance
Strongly unstable treatment (λ =2 )
RE 5.91 0.25 5.91 0.25 5.91 0.25
group 1 5.92 3.33 5.64 0.66 5.78 1.97
group 2 5.94 6.58 6.07 2.05 6.01 4.23
group 3 6.07 4.75 5.50 3.32 5.79 4.04
group 4 5.96 1.44 6.01 1.75 5.99 1.56
group 5 6.12 2.58 5.77 2.06 5.95 2.30
group 6 5.96 2.37 6.18 0.95 6.07 1.64
Unstable treatment (λ =0 .5)
RE 5.73 0.25 5.73 0.25 5.73 0.25
group 1 5.87 1.03 5.71 0.60 5.79 0.80
group 2 5.98 0.67 5.92 0.26 5.95 0.46
group 3 5.93 0.74 5.85 0.38 5.89 0.55
group 4 5.72 0.92 5.79 0.53 5.76 0.71
group 5 5.86 0.67 5.78 0.40 5.82 0.52
group 6 5.89 1.01 5.92 0.46 5.90 0.72
Stable treatment (λ =0 .22)
RE 5.57 0.25 5.57 0.25 5.57 0.25
group 1 5.59 0.44 5.66 0.29 5.63 0.36
group 2 5.61 0.37 5.65 0.30 5.63 0.34
group 3 5.67 0.45 5.61 0.32 5.64 0.38
group 4 5.69 0.50 5.69 0.32 5.69 0.41
group 5 5.68 0.37 5.65 0.32 5.66 0.35
group 6 5.63 0.34 5.57 0.30 5.60 0.31
Table 3: Mean and variance of realized market prices for the strongly unstable, the unstable
and the stable treatment over the full sample of 50 periods and over the subsamples of the ﬁrst
25 and the last 25 periods.
29Strongly unstable treatment Unstable treatment
µ =5 .91 σ2 =0 .25 µ =5 .73 σ2 =0 .25
t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value
group 1 -0.65 0.52 387 0.00 0.50 0.62 157.21 0.000
group 2 0.33 0.74 830 0.00 2.29 0.03 89.85 0.003
group 3 -0.43 0.67 791 0.00 1.53 0.13 107.54 0.000
group 4 0.43 0.67 306 0.00 0.23 0.82 139.03 0.000
group 5 0.17 0.86 451 0.00 0.88 0.39 102.49 0.000
group 6 0.86 0.38 321 0.00 1.45 0.15 140.70 0.000
Stable treatment
µ =5 .57 σ2 =0 .25
t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value
group 1 0.66 0.51 69.8 0.027
group 2 0.69 0.49 65.7 0.055
group 3 0.82 0.41 74.7 0.011
group 4 1.34 0.19 79.1 0.004
group 5 1.15 0.26 67.1 0.044
group 6 0.38 0.71 60.9 0.118
Table 4: Mean and variance test for the full sample of 50 periods.
30Strongly unstable treatment Unstable treatment
µ =5 .91 σ2 =0 .25 µ =5 .73 σ2 =0 .25
t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value
group 1 -1.64 0.11 63.6 0.00 -0.10 0.92 57.14 0.00
group 2 0.56 0.58 197 0.00 1.85 0.08 25.26 0.39
group 3 -1.12 0.27 319 0.00 0.94 0.35 36.20 0.05
group 4 0.38 0.71 167 0.00 0.42 0.68 50.66 0.00
group 5 -0.49 0.63 197 0.00 0.37 0.72 38.06 0.03
group 6 1.41 0.17 90.9 0.00 1.40 0.17 43.84 0.01
Stable treatment
µ =5 .57 σ2 =0 .25
t-stat p-value var. ratio p-value
group 1 0.83 0.41 28.0 0.26
group 2 0.71 0.49 29.4 0.21
group 3 0.38 0.71 31.5 0.14
group 4 1.09 0.29 31.3 0.15
group 5 0.73 0.47 31.6 0.14
group 6 0.02 0.99 28.8 0.23
Table 5: Mean and variance test for the subsample of the last 25 periods.
31